Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma
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Publication:5953422
DOI10.1006/GAME.2000.0836zbMATH Open0989.91012OpenAlexW2085667665MaRDI QIDQ5953422FDOQ5953422
Authors: Thomas Wiseman, Okan Yilankaya
Publication date: 7 August 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1248.pdf
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Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation
- COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: LEARNING OF STRATEGIES AND EVOLUTION OF PREFERENCES IN PRISONERS' DILEMMA AND HAWK-DOVE GAMES
- Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
- Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
- Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
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