Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics

DOI10.1007/s11464-015-0478-7zbMath1319.91034OpenAlexW1510880869MaRDI QIDQ2355247

Yunshyong Chow

Publication date: 21 July 2015

Published in: Frontiers of Mathematics in China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11464-015-0478-7

zbMATH Keywords

local interactionbest responseprisoner's dilemma gamelong run equilibriumfull cooperationparallel updating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• A limit theorem for a class of inhomogeneous Markov processes
• Evolving aspirations and cooperation
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with one-dimensional local interaction and imitation
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma

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