Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
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Publication:3142518
DOI10.2307/2951493zbMath0802.90143OpenAlexW2142925354WikidataQ56430509 ScholiaQ56430509MaRDI QIDQ3142518
Publication date: 20 December 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391.pdf
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