Mixing time and stationary expected social welfare of logit dynamics
DOI10.1007/s00224-013-9458-zzbMath1291.91026arXiv1002.3474OpenAlexW2169852109WikidataQ58219138 ScholiaQ58219138MaRDI QIDQ372983
Vincenzo Auletta, Francesco Pasquale, Diodato Ferraioli, Giuseppe Persiano
Publication date: 21 October 2013
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.3474
Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Welfare economics (91B15)
Related Items (11)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Mixing time and stationary expected social welfare of logit dynamics
- Worst-case equilibria
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games
- The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
This page was built for publication: Mixing time and stationary expected social welfare of logit dynamics