The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0601-yzbMath1417.91105arXiv1512.04017OpenAlexW2293202977MaRDI QIDQ1621728

Paolo Penna

Publication date: 9 November 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.04017

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionstochastic stabilitypotential gamesdistributed dynamicslogit-response dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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