scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3997197
zbMath0693.90098MaRDI QIDQ3997197
John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten
Publication date: 17 September 1992
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
equilibrium pointsequilibrium selectionnoncooperative gamesbargainingBayesian rationalityrisk dominancepayoff dominanceimperfectnessuniformly perfectly equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)
Related Items
Strategy abundance in \(2\times 2\) games for arbitrary mutation rates, Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games, The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint, A model of a general parimutuel system: Characterizations and equilibrium selection, A game theoretical model of deforestation in human-environment relationships, Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture, Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations, Strategy selection in structured populations, Nash refinements of equilibria, Endogenous price leadership, Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations, The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation, Dynamic stability and learning processes in \(2\times 2\) coordination games, A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information, An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives, Several Bayesians: a review. (With discussion), Endogenous correlated equilibria in noncooperative games, Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results, Communication, leadership and coordination failure, A parimutuel system with two horses and a continuum of bettors, An axiomatization of plays in repeated games, Strong migration limit for games in structured populations: applications to dominance hierarchy and set structure, Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information, On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability, Nondominated Nash points: application of biobjective mixed integer programming, Problems of normative and descriptive decision theories, Computing pure Nash equilibria in network revenue management games, Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall, Contribution-based grouping under noise, Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games, Multi-player matrix games, Team selection factor pricing with discrete and inhomogeneous factors, Games with imperfectly observable commitment, Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination, Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice, Communication, risk, and efficiency in games, A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case, Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game, Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play, Coalition formation as a dynamic process., A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria., The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games, Evolutionary dynamics and the evolution of multiplayer cooperation in a subdivided population, How to play \((3\times 3)\)-games.: A strategy method experiment., Equilibrium selection in bargaining models., A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution., Weak isomorphism of extensive games., A mixed 0-1 linear programming approach to the computation of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a finite \(n\)-person game in normal form, A model of noisy introspection., How to select a solution in generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining, Bidirectional constraint satisfaction in rational strategic decision making, Symmetric games revisited, A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations, Player importance and forward induction, Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination, Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information, The noncooperative transportation problem and linear generalized Nash games, Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks, Average behavior in learning models, Metastability of logit dynamics for coordination games, Prospect dynamics and loss dominance, Network formation and social coordination, Strategy switches and co-action equilibria in a minority game, Density games, Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability, Forward induction in coordination games, Two examples of strategic equilibrium, Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game. Theory and experimental evidence, Evolutionary games with two timescales, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities., The intraday liquidity management game, Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs, Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games, Quality of group decisions, Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games, The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation, Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games, Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result, Communication, computability, and common interest games, Adaptive learning and equilibrium selection in experimental coordination games: An ARCH(1) approach, Endogenous Stackelberg leadership, An algorithmic approach toward the tracing procedure for bi-matrix games, A concept of equilibrium for a game under uncertainty, Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games, Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games, Focal points in framed strategic forms, Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies, Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture, Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria, Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice, Explaining cross-supplies, Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation, Conventions and local interaction structures: experimental evidence., On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games., John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior., Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games, Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities., \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics., Universally converging adjustment processes -- a unifying approach., Optimal stealing time, Aspiration can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations as in regular graphs, Some results of Maria Serna on strategic games: complexity of equilibria and models, Evolving cooperation, Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games, Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) coordination games, Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations, The tracing procedure: A self-correcting reasoning procedure, Computing approximate Nash equilibria in general network revenue management games, Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games, Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note, Can the majority lose the election?, Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory, Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games, Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics, Collective action: experimental evidence, A characterization of stochastically stable networks, Existence of Berge equilibrium in conflicts under uncertainty, Convergence to equilibrium of logit dynamics for strategic games, On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games, \(p\)-best response set, Continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration, Stable equilibria and forward induction, Mixing time and stationary expected social welfare of logit dynamics, Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence, Money illusion and coordination failure, Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach, Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games, Coordination and local interaction: Experimental evidence, Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?, Evaluating the reliance on past choices in adaptive learning models, Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria, The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games, Information, interaction and memory, Constrained interactions and social coordination, A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game, Logit dynamics with concurrent updates for local interaction potential games, A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments, Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models, Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games, Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games, Relaxing competition through speculation: committing to a negative supply slope, Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games, Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games, Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks, Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions, Imperfect best-response mechanisms, Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem, Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory, The framing of games and the psychology of play, Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets, The complexity of game isomorphism, Backward induction and unacceptable offers, Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs, Symmetric play in repeated allocation games, Corrigendum to ``Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics, Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations, The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation, Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection, Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk, The strength of a little perfection, An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination, Learning and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) games. Some simulation results, Experiments with network formation, Evolutionary potential games on lattices, Coordination and culture, Local interactions under switching costs, A bargaining approach to coordination in networks, Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations, Contagion and efficiency, The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law, Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space, Mutual support in games: some properties of Berge equilibria, The chairman's paradox revisited, Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player, Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach, Introduction to experimental game theory, A backward induction experiment, A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication, Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in \(N\)-person games, To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets, Rule evolution and equilibrium selection, The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs, Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents, Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?, Social coordination with locally observable types, Understanding perpetual R\&D races, Epistemically robust strategy subsets, Games of multicellularity, Existence, uniqueness and stability of weak solutions of parabolic systems with discontinuous nonlinearities, Analysis of decision-making in economic chaos control, Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants, Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium, Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players, Individually-optimal equilibria of noncooperative games in preference relations, Theoretical tools for understanding and aiding dynamic decision making, Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination, Adaptive approaches to stochastic programming, Values for interior operator games, A globally convergent algorithm to compute all Nash equilibria for \(n\)-person games, On max-min solutions of fuzzy games with nonlinear memberships functions, COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS, A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME, Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study, Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space, Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term, Strategic ambiguity and decision-making: an experimental study, Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria, Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games, Weighted Boolean Formula Games, Dissonance Minimization as a Microfoundation of Social Influence in Models of Opinion Formation, A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks, An Interior-Point Differentiable Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games, The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games, Exploration-exploitation in multi-agent learning: catastrophe theory meets game theory, Finite uniform approximation of two-person games defined on a product of staircase-function infinite spaces, The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition, A note on anti-Nash equilibrium for bimatrix game, Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?, Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games, Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form, The effect of false positives: Why fuzzy message detection leads to fuzzy privacy guarantees?, Three-player game-theoretic allocation of indivisible resources during natural disasters, A Bayesian reinforcement learning approach in Markov games for computing near-optimal policies, Deep and shallow thinking in the long run, Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games, Unrestricted information acquisition, On sustainable equilibria, Coordination via delay: theory and experiment, The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods games, Unstable diffusion in social networks, Symmetry in \(n\)-player games, The computation of pairwise stable networks, Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice, Meta level equilibrium selection for two illustrative noncooperative games, Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions, Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium, Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: theory and experiment, Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution, To outsource or not: bike-share rebalancing strategies under the service quality deviation of a third party, Social coordination and network formation in bipartite networks, Rationality in games and institutions, Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints, Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values, Causal Decision Theory, Unnamed Item, A FUZZY LOGIC AND DEFAULT REASONING MODEL OF SOCIAL NORMS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES UNDER UNFORESEEN CONTINGENCIES, EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS, Evolutionary Game Theory, QUANTUM INFORMATION APPROACH TO NORMAL REPRESENTATION OF EXTENSIVE GAMES, Travelling waves for games in economics and biology, Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium, Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts, A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence, An experimental study of costly coordination, Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction, Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method, Super weak isomorphism of extensive games, Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal's \(t\)-solutions, Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria, Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games, Selection of a desirable equilibrium by subjective motive distributions, The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements, From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence, EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES, Learning game theory from John Harsanyi, List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997, Stochastic approximation algorithms: overview and recent trends., \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly, The evolution of focal points, Evolutionary game dynamics, Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions, A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games, STRATEGIC CHOICE BETWEEN PROCESS AND PRODUCT INNOVATION UNDER DIFFERENT COMPETITIVE REGIMES, Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model, Equilibrium Selection via Optimal Transport, EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH, A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS, How Risky is it to Deviate from Nash Equilibrium?, A best-response approach for equilibrium selection in two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problems, EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES, Social Motives and Expectations in One-Shot Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemmas, Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics, Unnamed Item, Regularization and Approximation Methods in Stackelberg Games and Bilevel Optimization, A survey of static and dynamic potential games, Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, The value of a coordination game, On the implications of integrating linear tracing procedure with imprecise probabilities, Forecasting with imprecise probabilities, Entropy-norm space for geometric selection of strict Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games, On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten, An epistemic characterization of MACA, On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games, When and how much the altruism impacts your privileged information? Proposing a new paradigm in game theory: the ``boxers game, Resolving indeterminacy in coordination games: A new approach applied to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, Rapid evolution under inertia, Managing parallel inquiries in agents' two-sided search, A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games, Game theory and the evolution of cooperation, On a three-parameter quantum \textit{battle of the sexes} cellular automaton, Optimal partial privatization in an endogenous timing game: a mixed oligopoly approach, The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory. Nobel seminar, 8 December 1994, Darwinian adaptation, population genetics and the streetcar theory of evolution, On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities, An informational rationale for action over disclosure, Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: point prediction under partial identification, A reaction-diffusion system arising in game theory: existence of solutions and spatial dominance, The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes, The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory, Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding, What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence, Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency, Investigating peer and sorting effects within an adaptive multiplex network model, We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach's theory, Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria, An algorithm for equilibrium selection in generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Is knowledge curse or blessing in pure coordination problems?, Natural selection and social preferences, Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium, The replicator equation on graphs, Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games, A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory, Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games, An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium, Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, Robustness to strategic uncertainty, The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics, A differentiable homotopy method to compute perfect equilibria, With potential games, which outcome is better?, Multi-level evolution in population games, Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation, A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game, Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence, Dynamic approach to solving bargaining games, An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games, Unfolding social hierarchies, A fixed-point policy-iteration-type algorithm for symmetric nonzero-sum stochastic impulse control games, Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions, When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory, Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives, Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study, Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect, Games and cost of change, The unbinding core for coalitional form games, Learning a population distribution, When are efficient conventions selected in networks?, Uniform selection in global games, Lock-in through passive connections, Investigating equilibria stability on the basis of individual optimum principle, Market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics, The emergence of cooperation through leadership, Prisoners' other dilemma, The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games, Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas, Effects of network characteristics on reaching the payoff-dominant equilibrium in coordination games: a simulation study, Joint search with self-interested agents and the failure of cooperation enhancers, The logit-response dynamics, Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback, Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria, Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting, An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept, Bargaining with random implementation: an experimental study, Metastability in stochastic replicator dynamics, Quantum prisoner's dilemma in a restricted one-parameter strategic space, Sunspot equilibrium in positive recursive general quitting games, \(\mu\)-\(\sigma\) games, Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection, Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters, Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games, Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice, Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games, Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players, When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games, Economic harmony -- a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions, Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games, Fiat money as a public signal, medium of exchange, and punishment, Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game, The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of \(2\times 2\) games, Learning and total evidence with imprecise probabilities, Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games, Complementarity enhanced Nash's mappings and differentiable homotopy methods to select perfect equilibria, \textit{Put your money where your forecast is}: supply chain collaborative forecasting with cost-function-based prediction markets, Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist
