Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90039-MMaRDI QIDQ2641228zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wolfgang Leininger, Philip J. Reny, Arthur Robson, Martin Hellwig

Publication date 1990

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90039-m

zbMATH Keywords

finite-action approximationsinfinite-action continuous gamesperfect informationsubgame consistencysubgame-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

This paper relates infinite-action (continuous) games of perfect information to finite-action approximations of such games and thereby obtains a new existence proof for subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the finite-action case. Accumulation points of SPE paths of approximating finite-action games are shown to be SPE paths of the limiting infinite- action game. However, no such upper hemi-continuity property holds for SPE strategies. The discontinuity in strategies corresponds to a need for forward induction in the SPE construction for the infinite-action game, thus conflicting with the Harsanyi-Selten principle of subgame consistency.

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Cites work

• Consistent Plans
• Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
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• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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Cited in

(19)

• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• Perfect information games where each player acts only once
• Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: a learning approach via costs to move
• Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?
• THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
• Backward induction and unacceptable offers
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization
• Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
• The concept of subgame perfection -- some discontents
• ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES
• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• The \textit{non}-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions
• Asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Stackelberg games
• Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes
• Endogenous voting agendas
• On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
• Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games

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