Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90002-CzbMath0753.90018OpenAlexW2067253723MaRDI QIDQ1196624

Larry Samuelson, James W. Friedman

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90002-c

zbMATH Keywords

discountingexistence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Existence and local stability of Pareto superior reaction function equilibria in discounted supergames, Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets, Repeated contests: a general parameterization, Credibility, smooth expectation and inflation persistence

Cites Work

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