Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012zbMath1282.91079MaRDI QIDQ2437807

Julian Wright

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012

zbMATH Keywords

experiment; cooperation; tit-for-tat; grim trigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A90: Experimental studies

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Cites Work

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