Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.012MaRDI QIDQ2437807zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julian Wright

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcooperationtit-for-tatgrim trigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Continuous reaction functions in duopolies
• Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
• Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
• Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
• The evolution of cooperation
• Vancouver's Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies

Cited in

(7)

• The hot-versus-cold effect in a punishment game: a multi-round experimental study
• Selfish punishers. An experimental investigation of designated punishment behavior in public goods
• Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata
• McCockerel measuring individual punishment and reciprocity in a simple value-laden dilemma game
• A repeated strategy for dumping
• Mixed strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach

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