Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2437807
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012zbMath1282.91079MaRDI QIDQ2437807
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012
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