Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.012zbMATH Open1282.91079OpenAlexW3122232870MaRDI QIDQ2437807FDOQ2437807

Authors: Julian Wright 

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012

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zbMATH Keywords

experimentcooperationtit-for-tatgrim trigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Vancouver's Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies
• Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• The evolution of cooperation
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment
• Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
• Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions
• Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
• Continuous reaction functions in duopolies

Cited In (6)

• The hot-versus-cold effect in a punishment game: a multi-round experimental study
• Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach
• Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata
• A repeated strategy for dumping
• McCockerel measuring individual punishment and reciprocity in a simple value-laden dilemma game
• Selfish punishers. An experimental investigation of designated punishment behavior in public goods

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