Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.12.003MaRDI QIDQ2178016zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima, Tomohisa Toyama

Publication date 7 May 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsgenerous tit-for-tatimperfect private monitoringrepeated prisoner's dilemmaretaliation intensity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• Weakly belief-free equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

Cites work

• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Measuring the incentive to collude: the vitamin cartels, 1990--99
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(9)

• IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
• Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error
• Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets
• Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
• When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion
• Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
• Privately observed time horizons in repeated games
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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