Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
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Publication:1017787
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.10.005zbMATH Open1159.91336OpenAlexW2132980272MaRDI QIDQ1017787FDOQ1017787
Authors: Masaki Aoyagi, Guillaume R. Fréchette 
Publication date: 12 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/3140
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Cited In (19)
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment
- Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment
- A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
- Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments
- Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
- IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
- Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
- Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
- ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games
- The analogical foundations of cooperation
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
- Similar bidders in takeover contests
- Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
- An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
- Adding noise to the institution: an experimental welfare investigation of the contribution-based grouping mechanism
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
- At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
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