Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003zbMath1250.91051OpenAlexW1987524822MaRDI QIDQ2276558

Katsunori Ohta, Hajime Kobayashi

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesimperfect public monitoringmultimarket contact

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships ⋮ Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations

Cites Work

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Repeated Games with Frequent Signals^*
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion

This page was built for publication: Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact