Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
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Publication:2276558
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003zbMath1250.91051OpenAlexW1987524822MaRDI QIDQ2276558
Katsunori Ohta, Hajime Kobayashi
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
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- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
- Repeated Games with Frequent Signals*
- Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
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