Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.003zbMATH Open1250.91051OpenAlexW1987524822MaRDI QIDQ2276558FDOQ2276558

Katsunori Ohta, Hajime Kobayashi

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003

Recommendations

• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesimperfect public monitoringmultimarket contact

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated games with frequent signals
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games

Cited In (9)

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
• When imperfect collution is profitable

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