Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.003MaRDI QIDQ2276558zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta

Publication date 6 November 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesimperfect public monitoringmultimarket contact

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
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• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

Cites work

• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Repeated games with frequent signals
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(11)

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
• Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
• When imperfect collution is profitable
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry

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