Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.09.004MaRDI QIDQ337814zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta, Tadashi Sekiguchi

Publication date 3 November 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP650.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect public monitoringoptimal equilibriumpartnershipsrepeated gamessharing rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• The design and performance of sharing rules for a partnership in continuous time
• Efficiency in sequential partnerships
• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
• COALITION BARGAINING IN REPEATED GAMES
• Optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma

Cites work

• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(6)

• Efficiency in sequential partnerships
• Sharing sequential values in a network
• The design and performance of sharing rules for a partnership in continuous time
• Control rights in complex partnerships revisited
• Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem
• From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information

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