The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.11.004MaRDI QIDQ834876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jay Surti, Yuk-fai Fong

Publication date 27 August 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesprisoner's dilemmaside paymentssubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Review text

Consider an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (2 players), with different rates of discount and side-payments. The paper characterizes the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, for all possible discount rate configurations (nicely summarized in figure 1). When the difference in the discount rates is sufficiently large, Pareto payoffs are supported by side payments from the impatient to the patient player, and cooperation is less than complete.

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Cites work

• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
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• Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
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• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
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• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
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• Why to buy your darling flowers: On cooperation and exploitation

Cited in

(17)

• The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
• Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
• Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• Reciprocal cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma repeated with random horizon
• Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Cooperation in dynamic games with asymmetric players: the role of social preferences
• Prisoners' other dilemma
• Patience or fairness? Analyzing social preferences in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• CRRA utility and the sustainability of cooperation in infinitely-repeated games
• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
• Transfers in climate action teams
• Collusive price leadership among firms with different discount factors
• The UN in the lab

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