Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
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Publication:2123159
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105312zbMath1484.91044OpenAlexW3193876405MaRDI QIDQ2123159
Publication date: 8 April 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105312
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