Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
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Publication:4586016
DOI10.3982/TE1425zbMATH Open1395.91048MaRDI QIDQ4586016FDOQ4586016
Authors: Takuo Sugaya 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
- Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
- Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
- Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
- On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting
- Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Intertemporal hedging and trade in repeated games with recursive utility
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