Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 952981 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Coordinated Capacity Reductions and Public Communication in the Airline Industry
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Correlated equilibrium and potential games
- Correlation and duopoly
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- Folk theorem with communication
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?*
- Improving Nash by coarse correlation
- Markov chains and mixing times. With a chapter on ``Coupling from the past by James G. Propp and David B. Wilson.
- Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
- On general minimax theorems
- Potential games
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory
Cited in
(21)- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Communication strategies in games
- Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
- Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
- Cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction and local communication
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- On the value of repetition for communication games
- Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game
- Toward the Nash equilibrium solutions for large-scale pentagonal fuzzy continuous static games
- Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
- Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
- On Stackelberg leader with min-max followers to solve fuzzy continuous static games
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games
- Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- Self-evident events and the value of linking
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