Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
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Publication:5225084
DOI10.3982/TE3049zbMATH Open1422.91090OpenAlexW2599368478WikidataQ127805199 ScholiaQ127805199MaRDI QIDQ5225084FDOQ5225084
Authors: Yu Awaya, Vijay Krishna 
Publication date: 19 July 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3049
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Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
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Cited In (15)
- Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Communication strategies in games
- Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
- An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Toward the Nash equilibrium solutions for large-scale pentagonal fuzzy continuous static games
- Self-evident events and the value of linking
- Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
- Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games
- On Stackelberg leader with min-max followers to solve fuzzy continuous static games
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game
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