Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
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Publication:709089
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.06.005zbMATH Open1231.91024OpenAlexW2023843059MaRDI QIDQ709089FDOQ709089
Authors: Rui Li
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005
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- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
Cites Work
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Cited In (15)
- The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Folk theorem with communication
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
- Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
- Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
- Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: The Need for Nonstationary Strategies
- Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
- Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
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