Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.06.005zbMATH Open1231.91024OpenAlexW2023843059MaRDI QIDQ709089FDOQ709089

Authors: Rui Li 

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

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• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Cited In (15)

• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Folk theorem with communication
• Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
• Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: The Need for Nonstationary Strategies
• Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

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