Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.06.005MaRDI QIDQ709089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rui Li

Publication date 15 October 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
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• Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.

Cites work

• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Cited in

(15)

• Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
• Folk theorem with communication
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: The Need for Nonstationary Strategies
• Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
• Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion

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