Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00669.XzbMATH Open1145.91315OpenAlexW3022671280MaRDI QIDQ5489085FDOQ5489085

Authors: Michihiro Kandori, Ichiro Obara 

Publication date: 25 September 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.x

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrepeated gameimperfect public monitoringmixed strategypartnership gameprivate equilibriumprivate strategytwo-state machine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (32)

• Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
• Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
• Repeated games with complete information
• The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
• Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
• Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
• A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• A multilateral telephone bargaining game
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• When (not) to publicize inspection results
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
• Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
• Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Strategies in Repeated Games Part II. Asymptotic Optimality
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
• Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Instability of belief-free equilibria

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