Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
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Publication:5489085
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- Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
- The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Repeated games with complete information
- Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
- A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
- A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
- Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
- Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
- A multilateral telephone bargaining game
- Moral hazard and private monitoring
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
- Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
- When (not) to publicize inspection results
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
- Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
- Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
- Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Strategies in Repeated Games Part II. Asymptotic Optimality
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- Instability of belief-free equilibria
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