Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
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Publication:5489085
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.xzbMath1145.91315OpenAlexW3022671280MaRDI QIDQ5489085
Ichiro Obara, Michihiro Kandori
Publication date: 25 September 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.x
efficiencyrepeated gameimperfect public monitoringmixed strategypartnership gameprivate equilibriumprivate strategytwo-state machine
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