Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0643-9zbMath1411.91056OpenAlexW2897387657WikidataQ129087018 ScholiaQ129087018MaRDI QIDQ2424245

Dae Hyun Kim

Publication date: 24 June 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0643-9

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gameinformation structureBlackwell sufficiencypublic monitoringperfect public equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
• Public information in Markov games
• Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
• Comparison of information structures
• Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games
• Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

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