Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0032-7zbMATH Open1154.91310OpenAlexW2067176125MaRDI QIDQ857566FDOQ857566

Authors: Michihiro Kandori, Ichiro Obara 

Publication date: 19 December 2006

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Obara/Obara275.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyPrisoners' dilemmaRepeated gamesFolk theoremGarblingImperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Moral hazard and private monitoring

Cited In (9)

• An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
• Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
• Plausible cooperation
• Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games
• An observability paradox in linked enforcement
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Comparison of information structures for zero-sum games and a partial converse to Blackwell ordering in standard Borel spaces
• Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

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