Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0032-7MaRDI QIDQ857566zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michihiro Kandori, Ichiro Obara

Publication date 19 December 2006

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Obara/Obara275.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyPrisoners' dilemmaRepeated gamesFolk theoremGarblingImperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games
• Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(9)

• An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
• Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
• Plausible cooperation
• Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• An observability paradox in linked enforcement
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Comparison of information structures for zero-sum games and a partial converse to Blackwell ordering in standard Borel spaces
• Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

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