An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.06.005zbMATH Open1426.91031OpenAlexW2955432024WikidataQ127585184 ScholiaQ127585184MaRDI QIDQ2334832FDOQ2334832

Authors: Yoshifumi Hino 

Publication date: 8 November 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.06.005

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zbMATH Keywords

signalingrepeated prisoner's dilemma gamecostly observation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Folk theorem with communication
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Mediated partnerships

Cited In (1)

• Community enforcement with observation costs

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