An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
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Cites work
- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Folk theorem with communication
- High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
- Mediated partnerships
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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