Community enforcement with observation costs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.007MaRDI QIDQ472190zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yu Awaya

Publication date 19 November 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

community enforcementobservation costrandom matchingrepeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
• Community enforcement using modal actions

Cites work

• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Cited in

(5)

• The use of costless inspection in enforcement
• Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money
• On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Enforcement missions: targets vs budgets

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