Repeated games with voluntary information purchase

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.015zbMath1161.91316OpenAlexW1965042798MaRDI QIDQ1021588

Andrés Perea, Janos Flesch

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/45406ee4-f41a-4c0a-9bd8-a150f55689dd

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect monitoringFolk theoremcostly monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

The value of recommendations ⋮ Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ Community enforcement with observation costs ⋮ Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters ⋮ An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

This page was built for publication: Repeated games with voluntary information purchase