The value of recommendations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.005zbMATH Open1281.91022OpenAlexW2038074230MaRDI QIDQ2636775FDOQ2636775

Authors: Jeanine Miklós-Thal, Heiner Schumacher 

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.005

Recommendations

• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• New, like new, or very good? Reputation and credibility
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect monitoringmoral hazardinformation sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• A monopolistic market for information
• Viable allocations of information in financial markets
• On Modes of Economic Governance

Cited In (2)

• Tailored recommendations
• The perils of friendly oversight

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