The value of recommendations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.005zbMATH Open1281.91022OpenAlexW2038074230MaRDI QIDQ2636775FDOQ2636775

Authors Jeanine Miklós-Thal, Heiner Schumacher

Publication date 18 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect monitoringmoral hazardinformation sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• New, like new, or very good? Reputation and credibility
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring

Cites work

• A monopolistic market for information
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• On Modes of Economic Governance
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Viable allocations of information in financial markets

Cited in

(2)

• The perils of friendly oversight
• Tailored recommendations

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