The value of recommendations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.005zbMath1281.91022OpenAlexW2038074230MaRDI QIDQ2636775

Heiner Schumacher, Jeanine Miklós-Thal

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesmoral hazardimperfect monitoringinformation sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

The perils of friendly oversight

Cites Work

• Viable allocations of information in financial markets
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
• A monopolistic market for information
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On Modes of Economic Governance

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