Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1001814
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.004zbMath1154.91378MaRDI QIDQ1001814
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.004
91B06: Decision theory
91B12: Voting theory
91B44: Economics of information
91B08: Individual preferences
91B14: Social choice
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