Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0020OpenAlexW3004669380MaRDI QIDQ2099050FDOQ2099050

Authors: Brishti Guha 

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0020

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zbMATH Keywords

free ridingplea bargainingdiscoverypolicingjurycostly attentionpretrial beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Information acquisition in committees
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Rational ignorance and voting behavior
• Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

Cited In (2)

• Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort
• Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly

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