A theory of hung juries and informative voting

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.003MaRDI QIDQ980975zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fuhito Kojima, Yuki Takagi

Publication date 8 July 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem

Cited in

(6)

• Voting with public information
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
• Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding
• Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes

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