The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:490058)
Recommendations
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
- A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups
- A generalization of Condorcet's jury theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5030410
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
Cites work
- A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
- Collective decision making in hierarchies
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Monotonicity in Condorcet jury theorem
- On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
- Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
- Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
- Stay away from fair coins: a Condorcet jury theorem
- Symmetric and asymmetric committees
- The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
- Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
Cited in
(14)- Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
- Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
- On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting
- A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
- An application of simple majority rule to a group with an even number of voters
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
- Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision makers?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6612263 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5030410 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Probabilistic implications of the assumption of homogeneity in voting games
- The importance of expertise in group decisions
- A theory of hung juries and informative voting
This page was built for publication: The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q490058)