The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
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Publication:4368652
Cited in
(24)- Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective
- Symmetric and asymmetric committees
- Skill, value and remuneration in committees
- Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
- Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?
- Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
- Introducing difference into the Condorcet jury theorem
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Collective decision making in hierarchies
- The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
- On the optimal composition of committees
- On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting
- Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints
- The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures
- An application of simple majority rule to a group with an even number of voters
- Crowdvoting judgment: an analysis of modern peer review
- Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision makers?
- A comment on Koh's ``The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures
- One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic?
- The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Heterogeneous expertise and collective decision-making
- General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
- On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees
- The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees
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