On the optimal composition of committees
From MaRDI portal
Publication:485437
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0805-zzbMath1307.91068MaRDI QIDQ485437
Leif Danziger, Ruth Ben-Yashar
Publication date: 9 January 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4685.pdf
Related Items
The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees, Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor
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