First and second best voting rules in committees

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0215-6zbMATH Open1180.91089OpenAlexW3121404337MaRDI QIDQ2385126FDOQ2385126

Authors: Ruth Ben-Yashar, Igal Milchtaich 

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.323.9176

Recommendations

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
• Deliberative voting
• General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
• Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations
• Qualitative properties of profit-making k-out-of-n systems subject to two kinds of failures
• Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints

Cited In (21)

• Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
• Optimal voting rules
• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
• Voting in small committees
• Voting in the limelight
• Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
• Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision makers?
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees
• The price of `one person, one vote'
• Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
• Committees, sequential voting and transparency
• Introducing difference into the Condorcet jury theorem
• On the optimal composition of committees
• Linear voting rules
• Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
• Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
• The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Symmetric and asymmetric committees
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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