First and second best voting rules in committees
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Publication:2385126
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- Deliberative voting
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
- Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
- Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
- Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints
- Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints
- Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations
- Qualitative properties of profit-making k-out-of-n systems subject to two kinds of failures
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
- Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
Cited in
(21)- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting in small committees
- Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
- Optimal voting rules
- Voting in the limelight
- Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision makers?
- On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees
- The price of `one person, one vote'
- Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
- Committees, sequential voting and transparency
- On the optimal composition of committees
- Introducing difference into the Condorcet jury theorem
- Linear voting rules
- Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
- Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
- The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Symmetric and asymmetric committees
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