Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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Publication:4359764
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
- The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
- The calculus of ethical voting
- Herding with collective preferences
- Information acquisition in committees
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Picking the winners
- Storable votes
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Deliberative voting
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors
- Public information and electoral bias
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting in small committees
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Interpreted and generated signals
- Voting with public information
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- Sequential voting with abstention
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
- Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
- Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
- The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
- Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size
- Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Sincere voting in large elections
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
- Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
- Manipulated electorates and information aggregation
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
- Lying for votes
- Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- Pivotal persuasion
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Information aggregation in Poisson elections
- Modelling election dynamics and the impact of disinformation
- Voting
- Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
- How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions?
- On the consensus effect
- Elections under biased candidate endorsements -- an experimental study
- Reliability of information aggregation with regional biases: A note
- Voting on tricky questions
- A passion for voting
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Crowdvoting judgment: an analysis of modern peer review
- A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
- Majority rule when voters like to win
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Manipulation through political endorsements
- Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
- Voter conformism and inefficient policies
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
- Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
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