Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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Publication:4359764
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Herding with collective preferences
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
- The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
- Sincere voting in large elections
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Voting
- The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- The calculus of ethical voting
- Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Elections under biased candidate endorsements -- an experimental study
- Storable votes
- Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
- Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
- Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting in small committees
- Pivotal persuasion
- A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Voting to persuade
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- Pandering and electoral competition
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
- Lying for votes
- Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
- Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
- Information aggregation in Poisson elections
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints
- Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
- Voter conformism and inefficient policies
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- Voting with public information
- Sequential voting with abstention
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
- Manipulated electorates and information aggregation
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
- Public information and electoral bias
- SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- Manipulation through political endorsements
- Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
- A passion for voting
- Picking the winners
- Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- Reliability of information aggregation with regional biases: A note
- Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
- Deliberative voting
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Majority rule when voters like to win
- Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Modelling election dynamics and the impact of disinformation
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Stable unions
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Crowdvoting judgment: an analysis of modern peer review
- Interpreted and generated signals
- How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions?
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Information acquisition in committees
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- On the consensus effect
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