Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Pivots versus signals in elections
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Manipulation through political endorsements
- Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
- Reliability of information aggregation with regional biases: A note
- How effectively do people learn from a variety of different opinions?
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Pivotal persuasion
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Voting with public information
- Herding with collective preferences
- Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Elections under biased candidate endorsements -- an experimental study
- Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
- Voting on tricky questions
- Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
- Voter conformism and inefficient policies
- Stable unions
- A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives
- Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- Modelling election dynamics and the impact of disinformation
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- On the consensus effect
- Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- A passion for voting
- Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
- Deliberative voting
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Information acquisition in committees
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Pandering and electoral competition
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size
- Storable votes
- Sequential voting with abstention
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Majority rule when voters like to win
- Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
- Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
- Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors
- Preference monotonicity and information aggregation in elections
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
- Picking the winners
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting in small committees
- Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting
- Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
- Information aggregation in Poisson elections
- Manipulated electorates and information aggregation
- Crowdvoting judgment: an analysis of modern peer review
- Voting
- Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- Sincere voting in large elections
- Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints
- A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections
- Lying for votes
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Voting to persuade
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences
- The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
- Identification in discrete choice models with imperfect information
- The multiple-volunteers principle
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
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