Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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Publication:4359764
DOI10.2307/2171878zbMath0898.90050OpenAlexW2165084594MaRDI QIDQ4359764
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Timothy Feddersen
Publication date: 20 October 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1117.pdf
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