Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.008zbMath1292.91043OpenAlexW2102228069MaRDI QIDQ2442829

Sourav Bhattacharya, Sun-Tak Kim, John Duffy

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationlaboratory experimentsCondorcet jury modelvoting behaviorvoting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ Conservativeness in jury decision-making ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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