A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
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Publication:2206004
DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5zbMath1451.91053OpenAlexW3093690659MaRDI QIDQ2206004
Christoph Kuzmics, Daniel Rodenburger
Publication date: 21 October 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5
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