On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.002zbMATH Open1217.91017OpenAlexW3123610452MaRDI QIDQ550192FDOQ550192
Authors: Christoph Kuzmics 
Publication date: 8 July 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.525.6406
Recommendations
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cited In (6)
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
- Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market
- Tempered best response dynamics
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
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