On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.002MaRDI QIDQ550192zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christoph Kuzmics

Publication date 8 July 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.525.6406

zbMATH Keywords

learningexperimentationweak dominance\(S^{\infty }W\)-procedureiterated strict dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679849 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• The logic of animal conflict
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties

Cited in

(6)

• Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
• Tempered best response dynamics
• Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market
• A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies

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