Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
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Publication:1361871
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0133zbMath0877.90098OpenAlexW2136555697MaRDI QIDQ1361871
Josef Hofbauer, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 28 July 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4444.pdf
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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