Properties and applications of dual reduction
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Publication:976771
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0477-6zbMATH Open1231.91013arXiv0803.2091OpenAlexW2053660492MaRDI QIDQ976771FDOQ976771
Publication date: 16 June 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows to reduce a finite game into a smaller dimensional game such that any equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. This holds both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We present examples of applications of dual reduction and argue that this is a useful tool to study Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria. We then investigate its properties.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2091
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Cited In (5)
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