Properties and applications of dual reduction
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Abstract: The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows to reduce a finite game into a smaller dimensional game such that any equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. This holds both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We present examples of applications of dual reduction and argue that this is a useful tool to study Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria. We then investigate its properties.
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Cites work
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Cited in
(6)- Properties and applications of dual reduction
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7376763 (Why is no real title available?)
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3987075 (Why is no real title available?)
- Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games
- On reduction properties
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