Is having a unique equilibrium robust?
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Publication:952688
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.06.008zbMATH Open1152.91007arXiv0902.2771OpenAlexW3099302628MaRDI QIDQ952688FDOQ952688
Authors: Yannick Viossat 
Publication date: 13 November 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true of Nash equilibrium for n>2. The crucial lemma is that a unique correlated equilibrium is a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium. Related results are studied. For instance, we show that generic two-person zero-sum games have a unique correlated equilibrium and that, while the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is not open, the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique and quasi-strict symmetric Nash equilibrium is.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.2771
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Cites Work
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Cited In (7)
- On the openness of unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
- Equilibrium payoffs of finite games
- Properties and applications of dual reduction
- Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
- Correlated equilibria and communication in games
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
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