Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
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Publication:2150438
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01327-4zbMath1494.91024OpenAlexW3012286887MaRDI QIDQ2150438
David Lagziel, Ori Haimanko, Ezra Einy
Publication date: 27 June 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1901.pdf
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