Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
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Publication:3352876
DOI10.2307/2938316zbMath0728.90098OpenAlexW2130752181WikidataQ56481617 ScholiaQ56481617MaRDI QIDQ3352876
No author found.
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8a83305f83a86f7f1ca9fa5e15b22f42dade1a0a
Bayesian learningboundsnoncooperative gamesoligopolysupermodular gamescorrelated equilibriarationalizable strategiesiterated dominancepure strategy Nash equilibria
Noncooperative games (91A10) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Economic growth models (91B62)
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