On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
The referred paper deals with \(n\)-person games of strategic substitutes and with strategic complements, which reflect the mathematical properties of numerous economic problems. Namely, the attention is focused on the models where the products of best response correspondences are never increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. The main result shows that for such models the equilibrium set is a non-empty complete lattice iff there is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, it is shown that there are no ranked equilibria in such models. Some former results are slightly generalized, as well.
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