On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0285-9zbMATH Open1145.91040OpenAlexW2154195166MaRDI QIDQ943347FDOQ943347

Authors: Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal 

Publication date: 9 September 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/8826

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zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium setnon-increasing functionsstrategic substitutesgame of strategymonotone comparative statisticsnever increasing correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
• Weak and strong monotone comparative statics
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Comparative statics in non-cooperative games via transfinitely iterated play
• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
• Comparative statics of fixed points
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
• Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
• Strong comparative statics of equilibria.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Cited In (16)

• Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
• Directional monotone comparative statics in function spaces
• Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes
• Strategic complementarity in games
• Directional monotone comparative statics
• Rationalizability and learning in games with strategic heterogeneity
• Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
• Games with strategic complements and substitutes
• Comparative statics and heterogeneity
• Monotone comparative statics for games with strategic substitutes
• The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons
• Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games
• Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
• A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes

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