Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
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Publication:417707
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.006zbMath1279.91031MaRDI QIDQ417707
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p12009-2010-09-28.pdf
learning; global stability; correspondence principle; adaptive dynamics; monotone comparative statics; strategic substitutes; dominance solvable
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