A characterization of strategic complementarities.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00118-0zbMath1085.91502OpenAlexW3125104896MaRDI QIDQ1429919

Federico Echenique

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00118-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Spaces of games (91A70)

Related Items (13)

Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Games with strategic complements and substitutes ⋮ Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Two equivalence results for two-person strict games ⋮ Characterizing monotone games ⋮ Ordinal potentials in smooth games ⋮ The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses ⋮ Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games ⋮ Sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in terms of forbidden \(2 \times 2\) subgames ⋮ Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Directional monotone comparative statics ⋮ Rationalizability and learning in games with strategic heterogeneity ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: the case of Cournot oligopoly

Cites Work

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• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Comparative statics in non-cooperative games via transfinitely iterated play
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
• Comparative statics of fixed points
• Strong comparative statics of equilibria.
• Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
• The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Potential games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle

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