Rationalizability and learning in games with strategic heterogeneity

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1092-6MaRDI QIDQ2323602zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anne-Christine Barthel, Eric J. Hoffmann

Publication date 3 September 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1092-6

zbMATH Keywords

learningstrategic complementsstrategic substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• A characterization of strategic complementarities.
• Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Directional monotone comparative statics
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Games with strategic complements and substitutes
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Monotone comparative statics for games with strategic substitutes
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies
• On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
• Price competition with differentiated goods and incomplete product awareness
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Supermodular mechanism design
• The Cournot-Bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation
• The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Cited in

(14)

• On dynamic adjustment and comparative statics via the implicit function theorem
• Estimating heterogeneous agent preferences by inverse optimization in a randomized nonatomic game
• On the existence and stability of equilibria in N-firm Cournot-Bertrand oligopolies
• Iterated elimination procedures
• Special issue: supermodularity and monotonicity in economics
• Characterizing monotone games
• Ordinal potentials in smooth games
• Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects
• Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Strategic complementarity in games
• k-level forward-looking dynamics in monotone games: theory and evidence
• Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
• Oligopoly with network effects: firm-specific versus single network

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