Rationalizability and learning in games with strategic heterogeneity
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Publication:2323602
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1092-6zbMath1422.91292OpenAlexW2768375749MaRDI QIDQ2323602
Anne-Christine Barthel, Eric J. Hoffmann
Publication date: 3 September 2019
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1092-6
Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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