Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.005zbMath1369.91006OpenAlexW2296369933MaRDI QIDQ281388

Natalia Lazzati, Rabah Amir

Publication date: 11 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitioncostly rationalitystochastic supermodular ordersupermodular Bayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (9)

The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Prior knowledge and monotone decision problems ⋮ Special issue: supermodularity and monotonicity in economics ⋮ Aversion to risk of regret and preference for positively skewed risks ⋮ Rollover risk and stress test credibility ⋮ Directional monotone comparative statics ⋮ Discrimination through versioning with advertising in social networks ⋮ Comparative statics and heterogeneity ⋮ On the economic value of signals

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions
• Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Comparing location experiments
• Inequalities for distributions with given marginals
• The positive value of information
• A new look at optimal growth under uncertainty
• A characterization of strategic complementarities.
• Strategic intergenerational bequests with stochastic convex production
• Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions
• Another look at the Radner--Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information.
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

This page was built for publication: Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities