On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
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Publication:1896675
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1031zbMath0831.90135OpenAlexW2011353069WikidataQ56658242 ScholiaQ56658242MaRDI QIDQ1896675
Paul W. Wilson, Dale O. II Stahl
Publication date: 4 September 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4542.pdf
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