Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9614-zzbMath1390.91097OpenAlexW2111664030MaRDI QIDQ2636402

Alex Possajennikov

Publication date: 5 June 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43782/

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsignalinglearningbeliefsbelief elicitation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

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• Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
• Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
• A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

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