Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.004zbMATH Open1278.91037OpenAlexW1982563929MaRDI QIDQ665083FDOQ665083

Authors: Michalis Drouvelis, W. Müller, Alex Possajennikov 

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.004

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zbMATH Keywords

experimentlearningsignalingequilibrium selectioncommon prior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
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• Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets
• Can you guess the game you are playing?
• Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
• An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
• Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
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• Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

Cited In (4)

• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Signalling Victory to Ensure Dominance: A Continuous Model
• Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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