Learning to play Bayesian games.
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Publication:1429917
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00121-0zbMath1064.91024MaRDI QIDQ1429917
David K. Levine, Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 27 May 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (23)
Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours ⋮ Interval-valued cores and interval-valued dominance cores of cooperative games endowed with interval-valued payoffs ⋮ Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals ⋮ Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems ⋮ Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique ⋮ Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games ⋮ Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations ⋮ Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs ⋮ Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning ⋮ Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions ⋮ Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching ⋮ Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection ⋮ Maximizing survival time in a random walk on an interval ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs ⋮ On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Categorizing others in a large game ⋮ Games with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theory ⋮ The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
Cites Work
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- Social learning in recurring games
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- A Simple Model of Voice
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
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